THE LANGUAGE OF PRINCIPLE, THE PRACTICE OF POWER

By Ritvik Singh (Del of the Hindu)

Congress claims order; nations seek representation 

The Congress of Vienna portrays itself as an assembly set up in order to restore peace in Europe after a period of twenty years of revolution and war; its declared aim is to redraw the borders, reinstate legitimate monarchies, and set up a lasting balance of power over the continent. However, the first impression it gives Europe is not of order, but rather of a small number of great powers gathering round a map in order to decide the fate of those nations which are not present at the table. 

The contradiction in this situation is beyond dispute: although Russia talks about restoring stability it at the same time seeks to exert control over the Duchy of Warsaw. Prussia considers the annexation of Saxony to be a strategic necessity. Britain maintains that no one power should dominate Europe, even though it controls a large colonial empire. At the same time, the countries whose sovereignty is in question - Poland, Saxony, and a number of the smaller German states - are given very little say in the decisions which will shape their political future. 

The highest example of this is to be found in the way the Congress handles legitimacy. 

If legitimacy is to have any meaning at all, it must be that rulers cannot be removed simply because stronger states find it convenient. France, acting through Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, has on many occasions made use of this principle in order to resist the destruction of Saxony, on the ground that no monarch should have his throne taken away arbitrarily. The reason for this is that if Europe is to be reconstructed on the basis of law rather than by conquest, the rights of sovereign rulers must remain final and not open to negotiation. 

But the same principle is strikingly missing when Russia asserts its claim to Poland. Instead of defending Poland's political future on the grounds of sovereign right, the Duchy of Warsaw is regarded as territory to be allocated according to strategic advantage. Legitimacy no longer acts as a general principle and becomes a selective tool, being applied only when it serves one's interests and being disregarded when it stands in the way of them. 

The attitude taken by Britain and Austria confirms this trend. Although their resistance to Russian expansion is certainly presented as a means of defending the balance of power in Europe, it is just as much based on ensuring that no single power becomes overwhelmingly dominant. This agreement on common interests finally led to the secret alliance of 3 January 1815, in which Austria, Britain and France agreed to prevent further expansion by Russia or Prussia. The language used may be one of stability, but the decisions are still those of the people in power.

Perhaps Talleyrand's first objection is still the most pertinent one; he did not simply challenge the decisions under consideration, but questioned who was allowed to make them. For if it is only the victorious powers who determine the future of Europe and the smaller states are simply invited to accept the result, then the Congress of Vienna will end up causing the kind of political exclusion that it claims to be getting rid of. 

History will not assess this Congress according to the boundaries it draws, but rather according to the principles which it consistently upholds. Order based merely on the consent of the powerful is seldom long-lasting. The real test of order will be whether or not the nations which were to live under that peace had a say in bringing it about.